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I. INTRODUCTION
International trade is an area in which American agriculture has
had significant success and maintains hope for continued improve-
ment. However, it is an area subject to many difficult challenges.
Two of the most significant are export competition and market access.
Export competition, or competitiveness, includes attempts by export-
ing countries to enhance or expand export opportunities in order to
create or maintain markets for their agricultural production. Subsi-
dies and other unfair trade practices often result from attempts to in-
crease competitiveness in foreign markets. Market access or, as some
might more graphically describe it, protectionism, involves the erec-
tion of trade barriers, such as tariffs or quotas, by importing nations.
The variety of mechanisms devised to accomplish these two funda-
mentally opposed objectives is astonishing. Both competitiveness and
protectionism in the trade of goods have been addressed for years by
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The limitations
imposed by the GATT on both areas have established a trade liberaliz-
ing framework. However, the general perception is that agriculture
has generally been excluded from the GATT.1 Because the world has
seen some significant contention in agricultural trade, recent GATT
negotiations have included efforts to bring agricultural trade into the
1. This statement represents a gross oversimplification of the facts. Agriculture is
covered under the GATT as the GATT covers the trade in goods. This includes
agricultural commodities as well as industrial products. However, agricultural
goods have been treated differently under the GATT than industrial goods.
While industrial goods have been subjected to a fairly tight discipline, there have
been significant exceptions and exclusions built into the GATT, both in theory
and in practice. The United States has been primarily responsible for some of the
major exceptions accorded agriculture under the GATT. See generally, Henricus
A. Strating, The GATT Agriculture Dispute: A European Perspective, 18 N.C. J.
IN'L L. & COM. REG. 305 (1993).
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framework of the agreement. 2 The current round of GATT talks,
known as the Uruguay Round, was completed on December 15, 1993.3
In addition to the GATT, and perhaps largely because of its limited
success, regional trading agreements have emerged as significant fac-
tors in providing a framework for trade.4 Regional trading agree-
ments, most significantly the one in the European Community (EC),
have included agricultural trade to a greater or lesser extent.5 For
example, the United States and Canada entered into the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) in 1988, which is an important pre-
cursor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).6 After
a close and bitterly fought battle, the NAFTA passed a critical House
of Representatives vote on November 17, 1993,7 followed by a rela-
tively painless Senate vote three days later.8 NAFTA, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1994, unites Canada, the United States, and Mexico into a
regional trading bloc slightly larger than the European Community,
making the largest unified market in the world.9
2. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT To CONGRESSIONAL REQUES-
TEES, AGRicULTURAL TRADE NEGOTATIONS: INrL PHASE OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND, 8 (1988).
3. The fast track legislation authorizing the negotiations of the Uruguay Round of
the GATT gave until December 15, 1993 to finalize the agreement. On December
15, 1993, the 117 negotiating parties, including the United States and the Euro-
pean Community countries, signed the GATT. President Clinton promised to
submit the agreement to Congress for passage under the fast track authorization.
He has until April 15, 1994 to sign the accord. Once the President submits the
agreement to Congress, the legislative body has 90 days to approve or reject it, as
is. Extension of Uruguay Round Trade Agreement Negotiating and Proclamation
Authority and of "Fast Track" Procedures to Implementing Legislation. Pub. L.
No. 103-49, 107 Stat. 239,240 (1993). See also GATT: Easier Ride Expected After
Tough NAFTA Battle, CONG. Q. WKLy. REPr. 3463 (December 18, 1993).
4. "Many countries have sought to complement the multilateral GATT process with
a variety of bilateral and regional trade initiatives. Concern about the efficacy of
the GATT process has led some countries to focus more on such arrangements
than on their participation in the multilateral negotiations." JEFFREY J. SCHOTI,
MoRE FREE TRADE AREAS?, 27 POLIcy ANALYSES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 1
(May 1989). See also Tim Josling, The Treatment of National Agricultural Policy
in Free Trade Areas, (International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium
Working Paper No. 92-7, June 1992); Frederick M. Abbott, GATT and the Euro-
pean Community: A Formula for Peaceful Coexistence, 12 MICH. J. INTL. L. 1
(1990).
5. Tim Josling, The Treatment of National Agricultural Policy in Free Trade Areas
(International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium Working Paper No. 92-7
June 1992).
6. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, 19
U.S.C.A. § 2112 (West Supp. 1993). Exec. Order No. 12662, 54 Fed. Reg. 785
(1988) reprinted as amended in 19 U.S.C.A. § 2112 (West Supp. 1993).
7. H.R. 3450, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess. (1993) (enacted).
8. Id.
9. Richard H. Steinberg, The North American Free Trade Agreement: A Legal Anal-
ysis of Effects and Opportunities, 5 LAws OF IN'L TRADE, 1410.001, 1410.002
(1993).
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The successful completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotia-
tions and the ratification of NAFTA are important to agriculture.
Although the passage of the GATT agreement in the U.S. Congress is
not absolutely certain, the outcome of these processes will determine
the nature of the international trading system for the foreseeable fu-
ture. This Article will first examine the GATT, since it provides a
more general and comprehensive framework, and then look at
NAFTA.
II. THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE
(GATT)
A. History
Before the end of World War II, the United States participated as a
major leader in attempting to establish a more liberal world trading
system.' 0 These efforts to liberalize trade resulted in the establish-
ment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which was
designed to be an interim agreement pending the establishment of the
International Trade Organization (ITO).1 The ITO was to be the or-
ganization responsible for regulating international trade. However,
the necessary approval for the ITO never made it through the U.S.
Congress, and the GATT was left in place, continuing far longer than
anticipated and taking the place of the ITO.12 In the absence of the
ITO, the GATT has been "both the written set of rules for the conduct
of international trade and an organization that administers those
rules."' 3
The GATT's written rules have evolved through a series of multi-
lateral trade negotiations known as rounds.14 The eighth round of the
GATT negotiations began in 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay,15 and
10. For an excellent introduction to the origination of the GATT, see JOHN H. JACK-
SON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969).
11. Id.
12. An examination of the trade negotiations which resulted in the establishment of
the GATT is beyond the scope of this article. For a brief description of the pro-
cess, see David R. Purnell, A Critical Examination of the Targeted Export Admin-
istration Program, Its Transformation Into the Market Promotion Program and
Its Future, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 597-98 (1993).
13. Strating, supra note 1, at 308. For an insightful discussion of the institutional
nature of the GATT and the role it plays in rule making, dispute settlement,
enforcement, and other similar processes, see Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a
Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18 BRooK J. INT'L. L. 31
(1992).
14. Those rounds have been as follows: 1. Geneva - The initial negotiation of the
GATT - 1947, 2. Annecy, France - 1949, 3. Torquay, England - 1950, 4. Geneva -
1955, 5. Dillon Round - 1960-61, 6. Kennedy Round -1962-67, 7. Tokyo Round -
1973-79. JOHN H. JACKSON, IMPLEMENTING THE ToxYo RoUND, 10-17 (1984).
15. Spencer W. Waller, Symposium: The Uruguay Round and the Future of World
Trade-Introduction, 18 BROOK J. INT'L. L. 1 (1992).
[Vol. 73:211214
GATT AND NAFTA
concluded on December 15, 1993. The purpose of the GATT was to
reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade and reduce or eliminate dis-
criminatory treatment in the international trading system.16 "The
first five rounds were characterized by item-by-item negotiations for
the reductions of tariffs", and the sixth and seventh rounds took an
across the board approach to tariff reduction.17 Until the seventh
round, there was little success in addressing non-tariff barriers.18
B. Current Status
Until the present time, the GATT has focused on trade in manufac-
tured goods, excluded trade in services and intellectual property, and
has had limited application to agriculture. The Uruguay Round was
slated to bring all three of these areas more fully into the GATT
framework. 19 The negotiations successfully addressed trade in serv-
ices and intellectual property, but have run into serious difficulties.
One of the most troublesome issues to resolve has been agricultural
trade.20 Prior to December 15, 1993, there was considerable uncer-
tainty about the ability of the negotiating nations to come to an agree-
ment. If the Uruguay Round of the GATT was not successfully
completed by December 15, both the United States Trade Representa-
tive and the administrator of the GATT indicated that it would not
happen.2 1 The authorization granted for the GATT negotiations by
the U.S. Congress expired at that time.2 2
1. Export Competition
a. Subsidies
The objectives of the United States and several other countries in
the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations have been to liberalize
trade in agriculture by reducing subsidies to agricultural production
in the exporting nations and eliminating non-tariff barriers in import-
ing countries.23 The considerable difficulty encountered in reaching
these objectives caused the Uruguay Round negotiations to become
16. Strating, supra note 1, at 308.
17. JACKsON, supra note 14, at 12.
18. JACKSON, supra note 14, at 12.
19. John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions, 18
BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 11 (1992).
20. Strating, supra note 1.
21. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Cantor said there would be no extension of the
December 15 deadline on the part of the United States. GATT Director General
Peter Sutherland also indicated the other participants in the negotiations had
accepted the December 15 deadline. USTR Kantor Says Dec. 15 Deadline for
Completing GATT Talks is Final, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. No. 41 1775, 1775 (Oct. 20,
1993).
22. Pub. L. No. 103-49, 107 Stat. 239, 240 (1993).
23. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 1-3.
1994] 215
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
protracted.2 4 Subsidies on primary products, including most agricul-
tural commodities, are prohibited under the GATT Article XVI:4.25
However, agriculture, once again, receives special treatment. Con-
tracting parties to the GATT are free to provide export subsidies in
order to maintain their "equitable share of world export trade in that
product."26 The most controversial issue has been the high rate of
subsidies on EC agricultural production.
The French, in particular, have opposed the reduction of agricul-
tural subsidies.2 7 In November 1992, the EC and the United States
finally came to an agreement on the reduction of agricultural subsi-
dies. 28 Among other things, the Blair House agreement commits the
EC to a twenty-one percent reduction of subsidized agricultural ex-
ports over six years, a thirty-six percent reduction in the value of agri-
cultural subsidies, and a twenty percent reduction in farm support
prices.29 The French farmers militantly opposed these reductions,
claiming that they go farther than the cuts agreed to among the Euro-
pean Community nations in the Common Agricultural Policy negotia-
tions in July 1992.30 The United States, supported in this case by
many other countries, was unwilling to accept changes to the Blair
House agreement. 3 1 The conflict with the French over the issue of
subsidies was seen as the major stumbling block to the successful cul-
mination of the Uruguay Round.32
Toward the end of the negotiations, the French farm lobby demon-
strated a willingness to compromise on its demands and accept the
twenty-one percent reduction in subsidized agricultural exports in re-
turn for three concessions by the U.S. side.33 The lobby still wanted to
24. The GATT negotiations were originally scheduled to conclude in December 1990,
just four years after the Uruguay Round. Several deadlines came and went
before the December 15, 1993 deadline was set. Seven Years of Struggle Over
Farming at GATT Talks, THE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Sept. 20,
1993.
25. Stefan Tangermann, Proposals for a 'Rule-Oriented" Liberalization of Interna-
tional Agricultural Trade, 5 THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NE-
GOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 243, 250 (1991).
26. GATT art. XVI:3.
27. William A. Kerr, International Trade in Beef- Technical Issues for the Current
GATT Negotiations, J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L. 55, 57 (1988).
28. Keith Bradsher, The Trade Accord: Europeans Agree With U.S. On Cutting Farm
Subsidies; French Withhold Support; 2 Sides Compromise, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21,
1992, § 1 at 1.
29. Seven Years of Struggle Over Farming at GATT Talks, supra note 24.
30. European Community Commission Sympathetic to France on Blair House, Op-
poses Renegotiation, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA), (Sept. 20, 1993.)
31. Id.
32. Japan Warned to Open Rice Markets, Avoid Trade Talks Collapse, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 29, 1993.
33. Juliette Rouillon, French Farmers Scaling Down Blair House Demands, THE REu-
TER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Oct. 27, 1993.
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soften the interpretation of the minimum access clause requiring the
EC to accept a small percentage of food duty free.3 4 It wanted to re-
strict the U.S. corn (livestock feed) exports to the EC.35 It also wanted
the EC to be permitted to export existing surplus stocks free of the
Blair House agreement restrictions. 36 This concession was a major
move on the part of the French farm lobby and signalled a considera-
ble improvement in the chances of a successful Uruguay Round.
Ultimately, the Uruguay Round agreement contained the twenty-
one percent reduction in volume of subsidized agricultural exports, the
reduction of thirty-six percent in money spent on agricultural subsi-
dies, and the twenty percent reduction in income support payments
for farmers.3 7 It also retained a market access clause requiring mar-
ket access of at least three percent of domestic consumption, rising to
six percent over time.3 8
2. Market Access
The barriers that importing or prospective importing countries
erect to imports take many forms. Some representative barriers are
health and safety regulations, technical and quality standards, and
quotas. Tariffication is the process of converting these non-tariff bar-
riers into tariff barriers. Once the tariffs are established they can be
regulated and reduced. Future GATT negotiations can address spe-
cific tariffs or can target across the board tariff reductions. Eventu-
ally, the process could result in the elimination of barriers.
a. Tariffication
Bringing the tariffication process to the agricultural sector is a ma-
jor development of the GATT. The replacement of non-tariff barriers
with roughly equivalent tariff barriers allows for the negotiation of
lower tariff levels within a multilateral trading relationship. The ne-
gotiations of the Uruguay Round resulted not only in the tariffication
of some non-tariff barriers, but saw the imposition of a schedule for
the reduction of those tariffs.3 9
b. Quotas
Another difficult problem in the Uruguay Round of the GATT is
the quota issue. Some countries protect certain production capabili-
34. The percentage of food accepted duty free under the minimum access clause is
three to five percent. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Highlights of GATT Accord, CONG. Q. WKLY. REPT. 3464 (Dec. 18, 1993).
38. Id.
39. GATT Uruguay Round Ends in Geneva; Major Provisions of Deal Outlined,
(BNA) (Dec. 17, 1993).
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ties for reasons such as food security.40 For example, Japan has main-
tained a strict barrier to rice imports in order to sustain rice self
sufficiency. Other members of the GATT, such as Australia, have
problems with this restriction and have indicated a possible failure of
the round if the Japanese do not consent to an across the board tariffi-
cation.4 1 The GATT has historically contained provisions which allow
the imposition of quantitative restrictions on imports under specific
conditions.4 2
1. The Agricultural Waiver
In the early 1950s, under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjust-
ments Act, the United States imposed quotas on imports of certain
dairy products and sugar among other things.43 The United States
failed to meet the exceptions provided under the GATT permitting the
imposition of these quotas. The United States sought and obtained a
waiver from the other parties to the GATT allowing quotas to be im-
posed under section 22 in spite of the GATT prohibition.44 This
waiver is still in place today and has been the source of a great deal of
negative feeling toward the United States by other parties to the
GATT. If the United States can obtain a waiver of the terms of the
GATT in relation to its agricultural policy, other countries are going to
feel entitled to similar treatment. This continues to be a particularly
troublesome credibility problem for U.S. negotiators, especially when
the United States attempts to take the lead in negotiating terms in-
cluding freer market access.
C. Additional Concerns
Many countries have expressed a real concern about the potential
failure of the GATT and the impact on the world trading system. In
response to these concerns, as well as concerns regarding the EC and
40. "Rice policy in Japan is probably the strongest case of food security driven price
policy that can be found in the world today." DALE E. HATHAWAY, Agriculture and
the GATT: Rewriting the Rules, POLICY ANALYSES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMuCS
20, 27-30 (Inst. for Int'l Economics ed. Sept. 1987).
41. Japan Warned to Open Rice Markets, Avoid Trade Talks Collapse, supra note 32.
Kohei Murayama, Bad Rice Harvest Brings More Pressure to Open Market, JAPAN
EcoNoMIc NEWSWiRE, Oct. 29, 1993.
42. Quantitative restrictions or quotas on agricultural commodities are prohibited
under Article XI of the GATT. However, a variety of exceptions are provided to
account for particular problems, such as balance of payments problems, classifi-
cation, grading and marketing programs on domestic products, and domestic sur-
plus problems. HATHAWAY, supra note 40, at 108-11.
43. Dale E. Hathaway, Agriculture, COMPLETING THE URUGUAY RouND: A RESULTS
ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 51, 53-55 (1990).
44. Rex J. Zedalis, Agricultural Trade and Section 22, 31 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 619-20
(1981-82).
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NAFTA, proposals for other regional trading blocs have been ad-
vanced.45 A Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area has been pro-
posed.46 Among several other options, a Pacific Free Trade Area
trading bloc, including the United States and Australia, has also been
proposed.47 Another proposal, made in 1990 by the current Prime
Minister of Malaysia, calls for an East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC), to function like NAFTA, but excluding the United States and
Australia.48
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
(NAFTA)
A. History
1. Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA)
One of the two free trade areas of real significance to emerge since
the GATT came into being is the recent Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUSTA).49 It went into effect January 1, 198950 and pro-
vided a tariffication of agricultural trade barriers between the two
countries along with a gradual elimination of the tariffs over a ten
year period.51 Some conditions can give rise to temporary tariffs to
protect certain agricultural sectors from excessive harm.52 In addi-
tion, the countries agreed to harmonize health and sanitary regula-
tions in order to eliminate some of the more invisible non-tariff
barriers to trade. 53 The United States and Canada also agreed to
eliminate any direct subsidies on products exported to the other coun-
45. ScHorr, supra note 4, at 34-54.
46. Gary C. Hufbauer et al., Options for a Hemispheric Trade Order, 22 U. Mw
INTER-AM. L. REv. 261 (1991); John Whalley, CUSTA and NAFTA: Can WHFTA
Be Far Behind?, 30 J. CoMiMoN MKT. STUD. 125 (1992).
47. An interesting collection of essays published by the Institute for International
Economics, based on papers presented at a conference held Oct.31 - Nov. 1, 1988,
takes a look at a broad range of options for bilateral or multilateral, regional free
trade area. The essay on the Pacific Free Trade Area is just one in this collection.
PETER DRYSDALE & Ross GARNAtJT, A Pacific Free Trade Area, FREE TRADE AREAs
AND U.S. TRADE PoLcY, 217 (1989).
48. John P. Byrley, Regional Arrangements, The GATT, and the Quest for Free Trade,
6 FLA_ J. INTL. L. 323, 323 (1992); World: Are Trade Wars Looming?, Bus. TreEs,
Oct. 28, 1993, at 4; Malaysia Says Japan in EAEC Will Auger Well For Region,
JAPAN ECONoMic NEwswmE, Jan. 6, 1994.
49. The CUSTA text is printed at H.R. Doc. No. 216, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 297
(1988).
50. ScHOTT, supra note 4.
51. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFicE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE LOUISE
M, SLAUGHTER, HOUsE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INTERNATIONAL TRADE: IIrPLMEN-
TATION OF THE U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, 12 (Oct. 1992).
52. H.R. Doc. No. 216, art. 702, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988).
53. H.R. Doc. No. 216, art. 708, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988).
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try and to consider the other country in providing export subsidies for
products shipped to other nations.54
a. Dispute Resolution
The CUSTA also included dispute settlement mechanisms; a Can-
ada-U.S. Trade Commission to hear disputes arising under the inter-
pretation and implementation of the CUSTA and binding binational
arbitral review for anti-dumping and countervailing duty disputes.55
The United States has maintained a steady stream of complaints
under the CUSTA against three Canadian agricultural groups: the
soft lumber industry, the pork producers, and the wheat producers.56
Some Canadians have come to feel that the complaints seldom have
merit and have been made as part of a systematic pattern of harass-
ment by related U.S. industries, particularly the softwood lumber in-
dustry and pork producers.
B. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Negotiations
Following the trade liberalization policies of the Salinas govern-
ment in Mexico, the United States and Mexico commenced free trade
talks. Canada insisted on inclusion in the talks in order to protect its
interests. The result has been the negotiation of a trilateral free trade
agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).57
NAFTA is an agreement that liberalizes trade and investment rela-
tions among the three North American countries. After a particularly
rough ride and a great deal of uncertainty, NAFTA finally passed the
critical congressional hurdle in the United States.58
54. H.R. Doc. No. 216, art. 701, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 297 (1988).
55. Chapter 18 of the CUSTA provides that any disputes that relate to the interpre-
tation or application of the CUSTA will be referred to the Canada-United States
Trade Commission. James F. Smith & Marilyn Whitney, The Dispute Settlement
Mechanism of the NAFTA and Agriculture, 68 N.D. L. REV. 567, 571-73 (1992).
Chapter 19 of the CUSTA provides that any disputes that relate to anti-dumping
and countervailing duty may be referred to Binational Arbitral Review Panels.
Id. at 583-86.
56. "Even the strongest defenders of free trade have been dismayed by continuing
trade complaints by U.S. corporations against Canadian exports." Ian Austen,
Trade Deals Likely Safe With Liberals, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 27, 1993, at E2.
57. THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA, THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES AND THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED NORTH AMERICA FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT, Aug. 12, 1992.
58. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, PUB. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993).
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1. Major Provisions of NAFTA
NAFTA provides a comprehensive framework for the implementa-
tion of free trade among Canada, the United States, and Mexico.5 9
This liberalization not only includes resolution of market access and
export promotion issues, but also includes provisions allowing freer
investment opportunities.
The agreement calls for elimination of non-tariff barriers through
tariffication and harmonization of barriers that cannot reasonably be
subjected to tariffication, such as health and sanitary standards for
agricultural products.
C. Current Status
Implementation of NAFTA was scheduled for January 1, 1994.
This required legislative ratification in all three countries and imple-
mentation of NAFTA in domestic law.
1. Canadian Status and Concerns
Under the Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, and subsequently Prime Minister Kim Campbell,
NAFTA enjoyed the full backing and support of the Canadian govern-
ment. In fact it was a 1985 meeting between Prime Minister Mulro-
ney and President Reagan of the United States that initiated the
Canada-U.S. free trade talks. NAFTA was approved by the Canadian
Parliament while the Progressive Conservative Party was in power.
However, NAFTA could not be proclaimed into law in Canada until it
had been ratified in the United States and Mexico. In the meantime,
Canada held a general election on October 25, 1993.60
a. Election of the Liberal Government
The Progressive Conservative Party went from 158 seats, a major-
ity, in the Canadian Parliament to two seats. 6 1 The Liberal Party, led
by Jean Chretien, swept to a stunning victory in the elections garner-
ing 178 seats. 62 The new Liberal Prime Minister of Canada immedi-
ately indicated a need to address subsidies, countervailing duties, and
energy before proclaiming NAFTA into law.63 This call sounded to
some like a demand to reopen the NAFTA negotiations. President
59. See generally, GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NORTH AMERiCAN FREE
TRADE: ISSUES AND RECONMENDATIONS, (1992); NoRA LUSTIG, NORTH AmRICAN
FREE TRADE: ASSESSING THE IPACT (1992).
60. Canada's Tories Get the Boot, THE WASH. TmEs, Oct. 29, 1993, at A22.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. John Geddes & Peter Morton, Chretien Firm on NAFTA, FIN. POST, Oct. 28, 1993,
at 15.
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Salinas of Mexico and President Clinton of the United States both re-
sponded with a clear and unequivocal message that the agreement is
in place and negotiations will not be reopened.64 The resolution to
this problem will be the continued working out of details that refine
the implementation of NAFTA, but do not require renegotiation of the
agreement itself. Many of these aspects do not necessarily have to be
negotiated before the implementation of the agreement.
1. Additional Concerns: Subsidies, Countervailing Duties,
Dispute Resolution, and Energy
Of these issues, Prime Minister Chretien considers the subsidies
and anti-dumping codes to have the most significance. 65 President
Clinton does not believe the discussion of these issues will require re-
opening the NAFTA negotiation.66 Under the CUSTA, the terms of
the agreement allowed a seven year period to negotiate these items.
Although this has not yet occurred, the seven year period has not
passed, so negotiations could take place under the mandate of the
CUSTA. This remains one of the most problematic and uncertain as-
pects of NAFTA. How well the dispute resolution process will function
will only be seen with time.
a. Subsidies
The Canadians are interested in ending the disputes with the
United States and see the formal definition of acceptable government
subsidies as a possible solution.67
b. Anti-Dumping
Dumping is the act of selling goods abroad at an unacceptably low
price in order to garner market share. The price is typically defined as
less than the commodity could be sold for on the domestic market.
Canada would like to see a more comprehensive anti-dumping code
built into NAFTA.68
c. Dispute Resolution Mechanism
So far, the Canadians have not been entirely satisfied with the dis-
pute resolution mechanism under the CUSTA and want improvement
in NAFTA. They would especially like to put an end to what they con-
sider to be harassment tactics employed by U.S. competitors through
64. Calvin Woodward, Mexico Won't Budge on Trade Deal, CALGARY HERALD, Oct. 29,
1993, at A3.
65. Austen, supra note 56.
66. Austen, supra note 56
67. Austen, supra note 56
68. Austen, supra note 56
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the dispute resolution mechanisms. 69 Proposals in the United States
to allow U.S. judicial review of bilateral appeal panel decisions have
pushed some Canadian supporters of NAFTA into a tentative opposi-
tion.7O A swift reaction from the Canadians immediately after the Ca-
nadian elections seems to have had the desired effect of eliminating
the efforts by the U.S. Senate.7 1
d. Energy Industry Protection
One of the items Prime Minister Chretien indicated Canada
wanted was the same protection for its energy industry that Mexico
received in the negotiations on the NAFTA. However, statements
from energy industry persons indicate that the Canadian industry is
not concerned about receiving these same concessions. 72 The energy
industry in Mexico is a state owned and regulated industry. In Can-
ada, the energy industry is primarily privately held and the Conserva-
tive government has deregulated the industry. The industry doubts
that it needs to retain the right to abrogate long-term contracts to pro-
tect energy reserves. 73
2. Mexican Status and Concerns
a. Trade and Investment Liberalization
Since the election of the Salinas de Gartori administration, Mexico
has undergone a radical process of trade and investment liberaliza-
tion.74 This has been more than a token modification of some trade
barriers. Land reform was conducted at a fundamental level, with a
modification of the Mexican Constitution of 1917, to allow private
ownership of agricultural land.75 Some of the reforms are designed to
provide a more favorable investment climate and remove some of the
most significant barriers to trade.
69. To illustrate the nature of the Canadian frustration, a look at the dispute pattern
under the CUSTA would be helpful. Twenty-three of the thirty-one anti-dumping
and countervailing duty cases brought before bilateral arbitral review panels
were brought because of U.S. complaints. Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Chapter 19 of the
NAFTA: Binational Panels as the Trade Courts of Last Resort, 27 INT'L LAw. 707,
709-10 (1993).
70. Kelly McParland, Ottawa Rushes to Block U.S. Changes to NAFTA, FIN. POST,
Oct. 29, 1993, at 4.
71. Of the different NAFTA Implementation Acts proposed in the Congress, H.R.
3450 version 2 was passed, rather than S. 1627.
72. Peter Morton, Energy Sector Uneasy Over Liberal's Pledge, FIN. POST, Oct. 28,
1993, at 14. See also Don't Hamper Energy Sector, FN. PosT, Oct. 28, 1993, at 16.
73. Peter Morton, Energy Sector Uneasy Over Liberal's Pledge, FIN. PosT, Oct. 28,
1993, at 14.
74. MATrHEW SHAEa & DAVID STALLINGS, USDA, THE MImcAN ECONOMY IN THE
1990'S: MARErs ARE IN; STATE CONTROL IS OuT, (No. 635 Oct. 1991).
75. Wesley R. Smith, Salinas Prepares Mexican Agriculture for Free Trade, HERITAGE
FOuNDATION REPORTS, No. 914 (1992).
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3. U.S. Status and Concerns
a. Economic Impact
Debate about the economic impact of NAFTA has been vigorous,
but few, if any, serious economists maintain that freer trade and in-
vestment will be economically unsound. 76 Rather, opponents of
NAFTA have identified a few areas where the impact will possibly be
negative. The most significant of these concerns revolve around the
issues of jobs and the environment.
b. Side Agreements
In the election campaign, Clinton addressed some of those labor
and environmental concerns and indicated that, if elected, he would
require side agreements on labor and environment be negotiated prior
to the implementation of NAFTA. That promise was kept.77 The
NAFTA side agreements were signed, but Clinton has since attempted
to placate some Republicans by suggesting that the United States
would not withdraw from NAFTA if Canada or Mexico pulled out of
the side agreements. 78
1. Labor
a. Job Loss or Creation
Labor has been the central focus of the debate over NAFTA. Oppo-
sition to the agreement focuses on job flight to Mexico while support
for the agreement focuses on the long term economic improvement in
both countries which arguably will create more jobs.79 This issue cre-
ated the most heat in the U.S. debate, with organized labor siding
with Ross Perot against President Clinton and many Republicans.80
b. Immigration Concerns
A significant domestic concern in the United States over the past
several years has been the increasing flow of immigrant workers
76. This work evaluates several of the economic analyses of the NAFTA. HUFBAUER
& SHOr, supra note 59.
77. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, H.R. Doc. No. 160, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess., 48, (1993); North American Agreement on Environmental Coop-
eration, H.R. Doc. No. 160, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 5 (1993).
78. Any of the three parties to the NAFTA may withdraw from the agreement with
six months notice. President Clinton announced on October 28, 1993 that the
United States would not be compelled to withdraw from NAFTA if either of its
partners withdrew from the side agreements on labor and the environment. Pe-
ter Behr & Thomas B. Edsall, Clinton Concedes Point on NAFTA Side Pacts, THE
WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1993, at G2.
79. See NAFTA Implementation, 51 CONG. Q. 3448 (Dec. 18, 1993).
80. Clinton Forms New Coalition To Win NAFTA's Approval, 51 Cong. Q. 3181, 3181-
83, (Nov. 20, 1993).
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crossing illegally from Mexico into the United States. Substantial
political, administrative, and enforcement efforts have gone into find-
ing a solution to this problem, without tangible success. Supporters of
NAFTA argue that the tide of illegal immigration from Mexico would
be stemmed by job creation in Mexico that would result from the en-
actment of NAFTA.
2. Environment
In addition to the side agreement that has been negotiated, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled on
June 30, 1993 that the government is required to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS) under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA).81 The government immediately appealed this deci-
sion to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit reversed the district court8 2 and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
c. Legal Concerns
1. Constitutional Issues
a. Separation of Powers
At least one commentator in the United States has suggested that
the arbitral review process of CUSTA "offends the separation of pow-
ers."83 Professor Chen indicates that the FTA violates the indepen-
81. Not only did the Court rule that an EIS was required, but ordered the govern-
ment to produce an EIS on NAFTA before the President submitted it to Congress.
This is based on the requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(1988) which states that "every recommendation
or report on proposals for legislation... significantly effecting the quality of the
human environment" have an EIS prepared by the federal agency preparing the
report or recommendation. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C.Cir. 1993), cert. denied 114
S. Ct. 685 (1994).
82. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that the submission of
NAFTA to Congress did not constitute "final agency action" under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA). Only final agency action is subject to the require-
ment of the APA, and the plaintiffs in this case had to rely on the APA, since
there is no private right of action under NEPA. Since the submission of NAFTA
to Congress is wholly discretionary with the President of the United States, and
the President could choose to renegotiate NAFTA, submit it as is, or not submit it
at all, the circuit court determined that there was no final agency action. The
action of the President, not the action of the USTR, affects the plaintiffs, and the
action of the President is not agency action under the APA. Public Citizen v.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied
114 S. Ct. 685 (1994).
83. Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of Binational
Arbitral Review Under the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1455, 1457 (1992).
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dence of the judiciary by not respecting Article III requirements for
federal judicial review and violates the Appointments Clause by fail-
ing to meet its requirements for the method of appointment of the
panelists. 8 4 Although Professor Chen makes a rather persuasive and
compelling argument, most legal scholars who have commented on
these issues do not agree that there is a constitutional problem.8 5
b. Sovereignty
In addition to the legal questions raised in the separation of powers
argument, concerns have been raised in the United States about the
loss of sovereignty represented by having international review panels
adjudicate trade disputes. To some, the surrender of any judicial func-
tion to an international review body, whether or not it has U.S. repre-
sentation, amounts to a surrender of some degree of sovereignty.8 6
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT and
ratification of NAFTA should result in a more stable trading environ-
ment and a more comprehensive system of agreements providing a
framework for trade. The tariffication of trade barriers will allow
member countries to address trade issues more easily. It will also give
the countries a greater incentive to honor the terms of the GATT.
Failure to implement the results of GATT negotiations could result
in increased trade barriers and increased subsidies to domestic produ-
cers. Countries have routinely violated and ignored GATT obligations
relating to agriculture. Although agriculture has been the focus of the
latest GATT negotiations, member nations may ignore their obliga-
tions as they have in the past. If this pattern of market access restric-
tions and unfair export competition practices continues, greater
reliance on regional trading blocs may result. The United States
would be forced to begin new negotiations on a variety of regional
trading agreements. However, if the Uruguay Round is successfully
implemented, the role that regional free trade areas will play is uncer-
84. See generally id.
85. As explicitly acknowledged in his article, Jim Chen takes a position that is mani-
festly against the weight of scholarly opinion. He states: "Contrary to the virtual
consensus among observers of the FTA, this Article argues that the FTA violates
both Article III and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution." Id. at 1456-
57.
86. "Canada and the United States have thus relinquished a bit of their individual
sovereignty over tariffs and trade in a joint effort to..." liberalize trade. William
K. Ince & Michele C. Sherman, Binational Panel Reviews Under Article 19 of the
U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement: A Novel Approach to International Dispute
Resolution, 37 FED. BAR NEws & J. 136, 136 (1990).
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tain. Will they flourish or will the Uruguay Round set the stage for a
diminution of the significance of these regionalized free trade areas?
